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With increasing internal conflict resulting in unprecedented numbers of refugees, 
countries are being asked to give more people asylum. While it is against Article 14(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to send refugees back to their home country 
before the end of a conflict, there are many cases of them doing so. To understand why this 
happens, past work has linked non-compliance in international treaties to three factors. One, that 
the treaty language was ambiguous, two, that the country does not have the capacity to carry out 
the treaty, or three that the social and economic changes in the country since the time of the 
treaty signing have created conditions adverse to the country carrying out the treaty 
responsibilities (Chayes and Chayes 1993). The main focus of this paper is to determine the 
conditions under which countries send refugees back to active conflict zone. Drawing from 
several different case studies that cite economic reasons as one of the main factors in several 
different refugee repatriations, I first predict that countries with limited economic resources are 
more likely to forcibly repatriate refugees into unsafe home countries. Drawing from research 
involving prejudice towards refugees as well as research involving ingroup and outgroup 
behavior, I next predict that countries whose citizens hold prejudice against refugees are more 
likely to forcibly repatriate refugees into unsafe home countries. In order to test our hypotheses, I 
tested GDP per capita as well as the percent of people in the country who reported they would 
not like to have immigrants as neighbors in the World Values Survey. I controlled for other 
country specific factors as well, such as level of democracy, GDP growth, type of legal system, 
and number of refugees received.  
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The international law regime surrounding the protection of refugees was started in 1951, 
with the United Nations Convention on Refugees, where 145 countries ratified it. In 1967, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that granting Asylum to refugees was a 
humanitarian and apolitical act, and at the very least meant that basic protections, such as no 
forcible returns to places where the refugee’s life or freedom would be threatened, should be 
extended (Jastram and Achiron 2001). The declaration passed the UN General Assembly through 
consensus; however it is not legally binding, but a normative of international law (International 
Justice Research Center)  
However, many countries decide to send refugees back to active conflict despite the 
reservations of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). As an example, in 
2003 in Tanzania, the Tanzanian government returned roughly 85,000 refugees to Burundi, 
claiming they were voluntary, while the international community and human rights organizations 
involved argued that repatriations were forced, and the return would put refugees in immediate 
harm (Loescher and Miller 2005). In the past four years, one in four unaccompanied children 
who are seeking asylum in Sweden were forced to repatriate to their home country or a transit 
country (Sundqvist 2017). This is especially relevant as the world is facing massive numbers of 
refugees, with an unprecedented 65.6 million people being displaced in 2017 (UNHCR data, 
2017).  
With these numbers on the rise, it becomes more important than ever to understand why 
countries break international agreement and send refugees home before their conflict is over. An 
international treaty is only an agreement, with no binding authority besides self-enforcement by 
the countries involved. While the International Court of Justice does handle country arbitration, 
the country in conflict would be unable or unwilling to bring the problem to the court. 
Additionally, it is countries, and not people, that are protected in most international courts, 
leaving refugees little recourse if they are in a country that decides not to enforce the treaty 
(Powell and Mitchell 2007). Some suggest that countries only sign international agreements to 
get the benefits of it at face value, such as aid or trade agreements, with no intention of following 
through (Cole 2015). There is also the suggestion that the root of non-compliance for 
international treaties takes place when first, the language of the law is ambiguous, second, there 
is limited capacity on the parties responsible for carrying out the law, and third, that economic 
and social change since the time that the treaty was agreed upon have made the country reluctant 
to follow through with their original intent (Chayes and Chayes 1993).  
Legal Differences Between Countries 
 One of the reasons that countries may not comply with international law is that treaty 
language is often ambiguous, leaving interpretation up to states as to how they want to enforce it 
and decide when it applies (Chayes and Chayes 1993). Refugees are entitled to non-refoulment 
(or the return of refugees while their home presents a danger to them), freedom of movement, the 
right to liberty and security of the person, and the right to family life, among other rights 
explicitly stated in the 1967 Declaration of Human Rights. However, there may be confusion 
caused by treaty interpretation. Increasingly, national courts are being called upon to figure out 
the best interpretation of international law, being asked to be impartial when enforcing national 
law, without regard for national interest (Roberts, 2011).  This results in different versions of 
international law, as interpreted by different national court systems asking to weigh in (Roberts, 
2011).  Some countries that have been asked to uphold the treaty seek their own national court’s 
interpretation of the law within the confines of their constitution. This especially holds true of the 
national interpretations of the Refugees Convention, with courts resolving issues about the 
definition of a refugee and what constitutes as a person fleeing persecution, and a body of law 
has been established to encourage uniform interpretation across different countries (Roberts, 
2011).  However, some countries still have more narrow views of what a refugee should classify 
as, and with more recent influxes of refugee situations, the legal definition of refugee is 
becoming narrower in countries who do not want to continue to uphold the law (Benvenisti 
2008). This results in refugees being sent home because the conflict or persecution they are 
fleeing from is no longer considered protected by their asylum country (Benvenisti, 2008).  
Additionally, past research has demonstrated the type of regime and legal system in the 
country also influences if international law will be followed. In addition to having a higher 
respect for the rule of law, democracies take human rights, and the violation of these rights, more 
seriously than non-democracies (Fox and Roth 2001).  Different types of legal systems also give 
rise to a different level of respect for international court decisions. As Mitchell and Powell 
(2007) argue, civil law states are most likely to accept the jurisdiction of international courts and 
follow international law, while common law states place more restrictions on their commitments 
to the Court than either Islamic or civil law states, and Islamic law states have the most durable 
commitments, making them the least accountable to following international agreement. 
Additionally, they view contract language differently. Civil law states adhere to a stricter 
interpretation of the language of a treaty, while common law states focus more on the intent of 
the treaty, even if that means not focusing on the language (Mitchell and Powell 2007). In terms 
of refugees, this can mean that some states get very specific as to what the declaration defines a 
refugee as, or the conditions of non-refoulment. Countries have the power to view these 
conventions differently and create and interpretation that allows them to send back refugees 
without, by the definition of their legal system or regime, breaking international law.  
State Capacity 
 In the case of state capacity, states often have every intent of following international law, 
but may not have the resources to accept the number of refugees the UNHCR sends their way. 
Countries that are the most successful at following international treaties are countries that have 
high bureaucratic efficacy, which correlates to high civil, political, and physical integrity rights 
provisions (Chayes and Chayes 1993).  For many counties, especially those near conflict prone 
areas, the infrastructure to follow through and take in refugees may not be possible, as well 
intentioned as their signature on the treaty may be. In conflict prone regions, some countries do 
not have enough money or housing for their own people, let alone refugees flooding their border 
with nothing but a few belongings (Achilli 2015).  
A country may have experienced social or economic changes since the signing of the 
treaty, and so while at the time they had the capacity and the willingness to do so, the new 
leaders in charge of the country no longer wish to continue the practice.  For example, in the case 
of the Syrian refugee crisis, much of the strain is on nearby neighboring countries, such as 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey, While Germany and Sweden have taken in the most 
refugees outside the region, there has still not been enough done to actually help the refugees.  
While many of these countries in theory could take refugees, the sheer number of those leaving 
the Syrian conflict has caused an overwhelming number in these areas, with not enough foreign 
aid sent to offset the problem.  Refugees can be a strain on the economic resources of a country, 
and in a country where social unrest is already brewing, it can be hard to take in refugees when 
there are already citizens in need of assistance.  
Economic Explanation for Forced Repatriation  
 State capacity, as stated before, is a significant factor on whether a country complies with 
international agreements (Chayes and Chayes 1993). A country may sign an agreement, but have 
limited state resources to carry through once the agreement needs to be carried out (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1993). Countries that host refugees, after all, are often geographically close to the 
conflict itself, and many lack economic stability due to having the same resource concerns that 
triggered conflict in their neighboring country (Cole, 2015). More than half of the world’s 
current refugees come from South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria, with most refugees going to 
neighboring countries in the same region, many which have low country wealth and so do not 
have the funds or infrastructure to take in refugees in the numbers that they are arriving 
(UNHCR data, World Bank Data). This can cause these countries to deny benefits to refugees, 
simply because they are unable to do so. This means that a country may fully agree that helping 
refugees is a human rights imperative, while still not being able to follow the international 
treaties in place to help these refugees.  
While there have been limited big data studies on the economic strain of refugees at the 
international level, most work has been case studies that provide anecdotal examples of the lives 
of refugees and explain some of the issues that refugees have in countries without resources to 
help them. For example, refugees from Somalia live in Kenya camps, where international groups 
offer limited resources and food to help them, with rations only lasting 10 days but delivered 
every 15 days (Horst and Van Hear 2002). Jobs in Kenya are not available, and creating 
economic opportunities for themselves is dangerous, making them reliant on remittances sent by 
family members in other countries, which is not something that all refugees have the advantage 
of having.  
The Kenya case is not unique. In cases where wars last for decades, refugees are confined 
to camps or settlements without chance of earning a livelihood, and are heavily dependent on 
international organizations for basic needs (Loescher and Milner 2005). In Tanzania in 2003, 
much of the reasoning for retuning the refugees to their home country was that it was the only 
viable option, given that Tanzania did not have the resources available to feed and house their 
refugees, nor the man power available to keep the refugee camps and nearby towns from 
suffering from theft and violence in the wake of insufficient supplies (Loescher and Milner 
2005). Because of this, Tanzanian officials decided to repatriate Burundi refugees before the 
long standing issues that made it dangerous for these refugees in the first place (Loescher and 
Milner 2005).  More recently, Syrian refugees in Jordan were causing an economic strain as the 
Jordinian government did not have the resources to keep up with the influx of migrants, and the 
EU had been trying to send money to these countries instead of taking on more refugees 
themselves (Achilli 2015). The influx of refugees started to decline, and the UNCHR claimed 
that local authorities on several occasions have denied access to the refugees trying to cross the 
border. After 2012, Jordan adopted a no entry policy and has threated to return existing refugees 
to Syria, despite the ongoing and deadly conflict (Achilli 2015). In many cases, countries have 
been economically unable to continue to house refugees, and this has resulted in their forced 
repatriation to their home country. 
H1: Countries with limited economic resources are more likely to forcibly repatriate 
refugees into unsafe home countries. 
 
Refugees as a Perceived Threat Explanation 
Some see refugees as a perceived threat, mainly in the form of economic resources. As 
mentioned earlier, there are insufficient international funds to fully help refugees, and so the host 
country of the refugees often has to step in. In many of these cases, the refugees are not an 
actually threat, but an easy target for the frustrations citizens of the country have about their 
personal economic situations (Healy, Thomas, and Pederson 2017). Because host countries view 
refugees as a threat, in many situations they are confined in camps, unable to seek employment, 
and not allowed to integrate with the general population (Loescher and Milner 2005). This can 
often create situations in which the citizens of the country feel that refugees are being given 
special treatment, and can create an “us” vs “them” mentality (Healy, Thomas, and Pedersen 
2017).  In a study concerning attitudes towards refugees conducted in Australia, prejudice 
towards refugees in participants was high, and correlated negatively to polyculturalism, or the 
idea that other cultures other than theirs should be respected equally, as well as openness, or their 
degree of willingness to interact with those different than themselves (Healy, Thomas, and 
Pedersen 2017).  
There are also studies that look into people giving non-race-based reasons for racial 
decisions. white participants were lead to believe they were either the sole witness or one of 
multiple witnesses to an emergency, one where the victim was white and the other when the 
victim was black. In both instances, both with single and multiple observers, the white 
participants were more likely to help the white victim, with numbers saying they would respond 
never dropping below three quarters of the participants. In contrast, when they thought multiple 
observers were involved less than half of them said they would help the black victim. However, 
their explanations for not helping this victim were not race based, but simply that they thought 
someone else might help them (Gaertner and Dovidio 1977). This could mean that economic 
reasons may just be the reason given by policy makers when they decide to override international 
law, when the real reason could be mistrust or dislike of refugees or foreign nationals. 
Nationalism across the globe is on the rise and multiple countries are pushing more domestic 
first policies (Wagner and Disparte 2016). Refugees are starting to be seen as outsiders who are 
creating a financial burden, or who pose a security risk, causing them to perceive them as a threat 
and dislike the idea of housing them (Healy, Thomas, and Pedersen, 2017). Housing refugees can 
be an unpopular decision in countries where economic strain is 
H2: Countries whose citizens perceive refugees as a threat are more likely to forcibly 
repatriate refugees into unsafe home countries.  
 
Methodology 
For my dependent variable, I used the refugees returned by country data collected by the 
UNHCR combined with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Active Conflict Dataset (UCDP 
2016, World Bank 2017).  I classified an “illegal” return as one in which the refugee was 
returned to a country listed as one having an active conflict that year according to the UCDP Prio 
dataset. All data will be from the years 1990 to 2016, by country, to account for the environment 
of international relations post-cold war era. 
Independent Variable 
 To test the first hypothesis, a regression will be run to examine how many refugees are 
sent back to an active conflict zone from each country. The GDP per capita data will be the data 
collected by the World Bank, with GDP per capita is the standard measure for economic 
wellness in a country, so this should be an accurate measure. To test the second hypothesis, a 
second regression included the World Values Survey question “Would not like as Neighbor: 
Immigrant or Foreign Worker,” (World Values Survey 2014)1.  While this is an imperfect 
measure because it does not mention refugees directly, in the interest of having a big sample the 
question, and the perceived threat it presents, they function similarly enough for the purposes of 
the regression.  
Control Variables 
 A country’s level of democracy will be used as a control because studies show that 
democracies are more likely to uphold international treaties, due to a respect for the rule of law 
(Fox and Roth 2001). In order to measure democracy, country Freedom House scores for the 
relevant years will be converted to a “1” for democracy if the country is labeled as “free” and a 
“0” if the country is labeled as partly free or not free.  
An additional control variable will be type of legal system, as defined and coded by 
Mitchell and Powell (2007), due to different legal systems having different levels of commitment 
to the international law. Additionally, functioning legal systems should allow individuals to sue 
in domestic courts, giving refugees more tools to protect themselves from illegal returns 
(Mitchell and Powell 2007). Number of refugees received by country per 1000 of the population 
will also act as a control, as well as GDP Growth, and population of the state as a whole, both 
also using data collected by the World Bank. Due to number of refugees received compared to 
                                                          
1 This question was asked as part of a list, where the surveyor asked “On this list are various groups of people. Could 
you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors” with Drug addicts, people of a different race, 
people who have AIDS, Immigrants/foreign workers, homosexuals, people of a different religion, heavy drinkers, 
unmarried couples living together, and people who speak a different language being options. The respondents either 
mentioned or did not mention immigrants/foreign workers. 
the population, the refugees received, and refugees returned by variable will be calculated by the 
variable over the state populations in 1000s so that there is a big enough number to calculate.  
Results 
As shown in Table 1, I found no support for hypothesis 1, as GDP per capita failed to 
reach significance in any of my models. When the regression was run without the WV question 
measuring feelings towards immigrants and foreign workers (Model 1), the only significant 
factor in predicting illegal refugee return rates is democracy. The results indicated that countries 
with democratic governments are less likely to return refugees to active conflict zones, fitting 
with earlier work by Fox and Roth (2001). GDP is not found to be significant in forced 











Table 1: OLS Regression Results for the Number of Refugees Forcibly Repatriated per 
1000 People 
 Model 1 Model 2 





World Values Survey Question: 
“Would not Like as Neighbors,  
Immigrants or Foreign Workers” 
 .0002243** 
(.0001012) 


































* p < .10, ** p < .05., *** p < .01 
When the regression is run with the World Values Survey question (Model 2), that question, 
which measures attitudes towards immigrants and foreign workers, becomes the only variable 
that is significantly positively correlated to the likelihood of refugees being returned to unsafe 
conditions. When this variable is used, due to missing values for missing years, I do lose over ¾ 
of my cases. However, since there are still 809 cases which can be tested, the variable still holds 
weight. What these findings suggest is that countries are more likely to return refugees if the 
citizens of that country dislike the idea of housing them, regardless of the country’s level to 
democracy, legal system, etc.  
Conclusions 
 The initial results of this project show that there is no connection between GDP per 
capita, or economic stability, and refugees being returned, despite numerous claims to the 
contrary. While there can certainly be cases where this holds true despite the trend, it suggests 
that there are many more cases where the reports and reasoning given by state leaders are not 
entirely true, perhaps to save face in the international community. Even with the control for GDP 
growth, added to measure if the country is going though a recession, there is still no significance.  
 At lesast tentatively, we might conclude that while the measure for perceived threat of 
refugees was an imperfect one, the sentiments displayed by citizens of a country towards 
refugees and immigrants are similar enough that the result could be troubling. The sort of 
thinking that excludes refugees and immigrants from humanity, marking them as an “other” or 
an outsider, can be fatal in these cases. While initially it appears that democracies uphold refugee 
law better, concurring with the findings of Fox and Roth (2001) I do find that once I include 
public anti-foreigner sentiments, democracies prove no better than autocracies. Perhaps this is 
due to their re-election odds if they make decisions that are unpopular with their constituents, so 
they made decisions that secured their seat at the potential cost of human life.  
 This project has been a start into looking at what factors cause forcible repatriation of 
refugees, but more research is needed. If a survey could be done about specific feelings towards 
refugees as a comparative analysis, that would serve as a much better measure. Perhaps refugees 
would illicit more sympathy than someone without that status, and the results would be different. 
This is just a small sampling of the factors that make the decision to return refugees, and more 
research should be done on other factors. Additionally, the World Values Survey greatly limits 
analysis as they only ask certain countries certain questions, and not every country is on their list. 
With the missing data, I was unable to test the same number of cases, which could have also had 
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